Judge Judy

There's a new entry in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Kant's Theory of Judgment, by Robert Hanna.

According to Kant, judgments are complex conscious cognitions that

(i) refer to objects either directly (via intuitions) or indirectly (via concepts),

(ii) include concepts that are predicated either of those objects or of other constituent concepts,

(iii) exemplify pure logical concepts and enter into inferences according to pure logical laws,

(iv) essentially involve both the following of rules and the application of rules to the objects picked out by intuitions,

(v) express true or false propositions,

(vi) mediate the formation of beliefs, and

(vii) are unified and self-conscious.

Theories of judgment bring together fundamental issues in semantics, logic, philosophical psychology, and epistemology: indeed, the notion of judgment is central to any theory of human rationality. But Kant's theory of judgment differs sharply from many other theories of judgment, both traditional and contemporary, in three ways: (1) by taking the capacity for judgment to be the central cognitive faculty of the human mind, (2) by insisting on the semantic, logical, psychological, and epistemic priority of the propositional content of a judgment, and (3) by systematically embedding judgment within the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. This article focuses exclusively on the first two parts of Kant's theory.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-judgment/